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1. Introduction
There are many papers devoted to the study of the properties and the ap-
plications of some particular integer sequences, as for example: Fibonacci se-
quences, p−Fibonacci sequences, Tribonacci sequences, etc. (see [1], [2], [4], [5],
[8], [9], [10], [11]). In this paper, we generalize these results, by considering
the general case of a difference equation of degree k, we associate a matrix to
such an equation and, using some properties of these matrices, we give some
applications of them in Cryptography and Coding Theory. We generalize the
notion of complete positive integers sequence, given in [6], and a result given
in [13], result which states the representation of a natural number as a sum of
nonconsecutive Fibonacci numbers. With these results, we give an algorithm for
messages encryption and decryption and, in Section 3, we give an application
in Coding Theory. In Appendix, we present some MAPLE procedures. These
procedures are very helpful in the encrypting and decrypting processes.
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2. Some properties of a difference equation of degree k, k ≥ 2
Let n be an arbitrary positive integer and a, b be arbitrary integers, b 6= 0. We
consider the following difference equation of degree two
dn = adn−1 + bdn−2, d0 = 0, d1 = 1 (2.1.)
and the attached matrix
D2 =
(
a b
1 0
)
=
(
d2 bd1
d1 bd0
)
.
It results
D22 =
(
b+ a2 ab
a b
)
=
(
d3 bd2
d2 bd1
)
.
Therefore, we obtain that
Dn2 =
(
dn+1 bdn
dn bdn−1
)
. (2.2.)
Since detD2 = −b and detD
n
2 = bdn−1dn+1 − bd
2
n = (−b)
n
, the following
relation is true:
dn−1dn+1 − d
2
n = (−b)
n−1
. (2.3.)
The inverse of the matrix Dn2 is
D−n2 ==
1
(−1)
n+1
bn
(
−bdn−1 bdn
dn −dn+1
)
. (2.4.)
If we consider the following recurrence relation of degree three
dn = adn−1 + bdn−2 + cdn−2, d−1 = d0 = d1 = 0, d2 = 1, c 6= 0, (2.5.)
we have the attached matrix
D3 =

 d3 bd2 + cd1 cd2d2 bd1 + cd0 cd1
d1 bd0 + cd−1 cd0

 =

 a b c1 0 0
0 1 0

 ,
since we can take bd0+cd−1 = d2−ad1 = 1. Therefore, using relation d4 = a
2+b,
we get
D23 =

 b + a2 c+ ab aca b c
1 0 0

 =

 d4 bd3 + cd2 cd3d3 bd2 + cd1 cd2
d2 bd1 + cd0 cd1

 .
2
From here, it results
Dn3 =

 dn+2 bdn+1 + cdn cdn+1dn+1 bdn + cdn−1 cdn
dn bdn−1 + cdn−2 cdn−1

 . (2.6.)
Since detD3 = c and detD
n
3 =
= c2
[
dn
(
d2n − dn−1dn+1
)
+ dn−2
(
d2n+1 − dndn+2
)
+ dn−1 (dn−1dn+2 − dndn+1)
]
,
using the fact that detDn3 = c
n, n ≥ 2, we obtain the following relation
dn
(
d2n-dn−1dn+1
)
+dn−2
(
d2n+1-dndn+2
)
+dn−1 (dn−1dn+2-dndn+1)=c
n−2.
(2.7.)
The inverse of the matrix Dn3 is
D−n3 =
1
cn−2

 g11 g12 g13g21 g22 g23
g31 g32 g33

 , (2.8.)
where
g11 = c
2(−dndn−2 + d
2
n−1), g21 = −c(−d
2
n + dn−1dn+1),
g31 = −(bd
2
n + cdndn−1 − bdn−1dn+1 − cdn+1dn−2),
g12 = −c
2(dndn−1 − dn+1dn−2), g22 = c(−dndn+1 + dn−1dn+2),
g32 = cd
2
n + bdndn+1 − bdn−1dn+2 − cdn−2dn+2,
g13 = c
2(d2n − dn−1dn+1), g23 = c(−dndn+2 + d
2
n+1),
g33 = bdndn+2 − cdndn+1 − bd
2
n+1 + cdn−1dn+2.
Now, we consider the general k−terms recurrence, n, k ∈ N, k ≥ 2, n ≥ k,
dn=a1dn−1+a2dn−2+...+akdn−k, d0=d1=...=dk−2=0, dk−1=1, ak 6= 0 (2.9.)
and the matrix Dk ∈Mk (R) ,
Dk =


a1 a2 a3 ... ak
1 0 0 ... 0
0 1 0 ... 0
... ... ... ... ...
0 0 ... 1 0

 , (2.10.)
(see [7]).
Proposition 2.1. With the above notations, the following relations are true:
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1)
Dk =


dk
k−1∑
i=1
ai+1dk−i
k−2∑
i=1
ai+2dk−i ... akdk−1
dk−1
k−1∑
i=1
ai+1dk−i−1
k−2∑
i=1
ai+2dk−i−1 ... akdk−2
dk−2
k−1∑
i=1
ai+1dk−i−2
k−2∑
i=1
ai+2dk−i−2 ... akdk−3
... ... ... ... ...
d1
k−1∑
i=1
ai+1dk−i−k+1
k−2∑
i=1
ai+2d−i+1 ... akd0


. (2.11.)
2) For n ∈ Z, n ≥ 1, we have that
Dnk=


dn+k−1
k−1∑
i=1
ai+1dn+k−i−1
k−2∑
i=1
ai+2dn+k−i−1 ... akdn+k−2
dn+k−2
k−1∑
i=1
ai+1dn+k−i−2
k−2∑
i=1
ai+2dn+k−i−2 ... akdn+k−3
dn+k−3
k−1∑
i=1
ai+1dn+k−i−3
k−2∑
i=1
ai+2dn+k−i−3 ... akdn+k−4
... ... ... ... ...
dn
k−1∑
i=1
ai+1dn+k−i−k
k−2∑
i=1
ai+2dn−i ... akdn−1


.
(2.12.)
Proof. 1) It is obvious, using relation (2.9). Indeed, dk = a1. Making
computations, we obtain
k−1∑
i=1
ai+1dk−i = a2dk−1 + a3dk−2 + ...+ akd1 = a2,
...
k−1∑
i=1
ai+1dk−i−2=a2dk−3 + a3dk−4 + ...+ akd−1=dk−1 − a1dk−2 = 1,
and so on.
2) We use induction. For n = 1, the relation is true. Let Dn+1k =
(hij)i,j∈{1,2,...,k}. Since D
n+1
k = D
n
kDk, assuming that the statement is true
for n and using relation (2.10) , it results the following elements for the matrix
Dn+1k :
h11=a1dn+k−1+
k−1∑
i=1
ai+1dn+k−i−1=a1dn+k−1 + a2dn+k−2 + ...+ akdn=dn+k,
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h12=a2dn+k−1+
k−2∑
i=1
ai+2dn+k−i−1=a2dn+k−1+a3dn+k−2+...+akdn−1=
k−1∑
i=1
ai+1dn+k−i,
...
h1k = akdn+k−1,
h21=a1dn+k−2+
k−1∑
i=1
ai+1dn+k−i−2=a1dn+k−2+a2dn+k−3+ ...+akdn−1=dn+k−1,
h22=a2dn+k−2+
k−2∑
i=1
ai+2dn+k−i−2=a2dn+k−2+a3dn+k−3+...+akdn=
k−1∑
i=1
ai+2dn+k−i−1,
etc. 
Remark 2.2. ([7]) The following statements are true:
i) detDk = (−1)
k+1
ak and
D−1k =
1
ak


0 ak 0 ... 0
1 0 ak ... 0
... ... ... ... ...
0 0 0 ... 1
1 −a1 ... −ak−2 −ak−1

 .
ii) Dnk = a1D
n−1
k + a2D
n−2
k + ...+ akD
n−k
k .
Remark 2.3. From the above, we have that
detDnk = (−1)
(k+1)n
ank . (2.13.)
Relations 2.3, 2.7 and 2.13 are Cassini’s type relations.
3. Applications in cryptography and coding theory
A sequence of positive integers, (dn) , n ≥ 0, is complete if and only if each
natural number n can be written under the form
m∑
i=1
cidi, where ci is either zero
or one (see [6]). In [3], the author proved that a nondecreasing sequence of
natural numbers, with d1 = 1, is complete if and only if the following relation
dk+1 ≤ 1 +
k∑
i=1
di,
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is true for k ∈ {1, 2, 3, .....}.
There are sequences of positive integers which are complete and sequences
which are not complete. An example of complete sequence is the sequence of
Fibonacci numbers. In [13], the author proved that each natural number can
be written as a unique sum of non-consecutive Fibonacci numbers, therefore
the sequence of Fibonacci numbers is complete. An example of not complete
sequence was done in [12]. The sequence (dn) , n ≥ 0, where dn = 4dn−1 +
3dn−2, d0 = 0, d1 = 1, is not complete.
In the following, we will generalize the notion of complete sequence and we
will give applications of this new notion.
Definition 3.1. A sequence of positive integers, (dn) , n ≥ 0, is called
general complete (or g-complete) if and only if for each natural number n ≥ 0,
there is a natural number q, q ≥ 0, such that n can be written, in a unique way,
under the form
n = d0a0 + a1d1 + ...+ aqdq, a0, ...aq ∈ N, aq 6= 0.
Theorem 3.2. The sequence of positive integers (dn) , n ≥ 0, generated by
the difference equation (2.9) is g-complete.
Proof. We consider the sequence of positive integers (dn)n≥0 generated by
the difference equation given in (2.9). Let n, q be the natural numbers, with
q ≥ k ≥ 2, such that the term dq, of the sequence (dn)n≥0 , satisfies the condi-
tion dq ≤ n < dq+1. We use the Quotient Remainder Theorem. Therefore, we
obtain the natural numbers cq, cq−1, ....ck−1 and rq, rq−1, ...rk such that
n = dqcq + rq, 0 ≤ rq < dq,
rq = dq−1cq−1 + rq−1, 0 ≤ rq−1 < dq−1,
rq−1 = dq−2cq−2 + rq−2, 0 ≤ rq−2 < dq−2,
........
rk+1 = dkck + rk, 0 ≤ rk < dk,
rk = dk−1ck−1,
with ck−1 = rk, since dk−1 = 1.
It results that the number n can be written, in a unique way, under the form
n = dqcq + dq−1cq−1 + dq−2cq−2 + ...+ dkck + dk−1ck−1, (3.1.)
Indeed, we can’t have k terms in the relation (3.1) ,
ds, ds+1, ...ds+k−1, with s+k−1 ≤ q such that csds+cs+1ds+1+...+cs+k−1ds+k−1 =
ds+k. In relation (3.1), if s+k < q, then the coefficient of ds+k is cs+k+1. From
here, we get
rs+k+1 = (cs+k + 1) ds+k + rs+k − ds+k.
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Since rs+k− ds+k < 0, we obtain a contradiction with the Quotient Remainder
Theorem. 
The above Theorem extend the result obtained in [13] for Fibonacci numbers
to a difference equation of degree k , equation defined by (2.9).
3.1. An application in Cryptography
In [8], [10], [11], [12], were described applications of Fibonacci numbers,
k−Fibonacci numbers or Tribonacci numbers in Cryptography. In the follow-
ing, by using Theorem 3.2 and the terms (dn)n≥0 of the difference equation
given by the relation (2.9), we will present a new method for encrypting and
dencrypting messages. This new method give us a lot of possibilities for finding
the encryption and decryption keys, having the advantage that each natural
number n has a unique representation by using the terms of such a sequence. It
results that a number cannot have the same encrypted value as another number,
therefore the obtained encrypted texts are hard to break.
The Algorithm
Let A be an alphabet with N letters, labeled from 0 to N − 1, m be
a plain text and n be a number obtained by using the label of the letters
from the plain text m. We split the text m in blocks with the same length,
m1,m2, ...,mr. To these blocks correspond the numbers n1, n2, ..., nr. The num-
bers ni, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., r}, will be encrypted using the following procedure.
The encrypting
1. We consider the natural numbers k ≥ 2, a1, a2, ..., ak;
2. We consider the difference equation of degree k, given by the relation
(2.9) , with the above coefficients a1, a2, ..., ak.
3. We compute the elements dk, dk+1, ..., dq, such that dq ≤ ni < dq+1, i ∈
{1, 2, ..., r}, as in the proof of Theorem 3.2. We denote s = q − k + 2.
4. We obtain the secret encryption and decryption key (a1, a2, ..., ak, s) .
5. We compute the numbers ciq , ci(q−1), ..., ci(k−1) such that
ni = dqciq + dq−1ci(q−1) + dq−2ci(q−2) + ...+ dkcik + dk−1ci(k−1),
as in relation (3.1) .
6. We obtain
(
ciq, ci(q−1), ..., ci(k−1)
)
, the labels for the encrypted text. If all
cij ≤ N−1, then we will put in the cipher text the letter L j , from the alphabet
A, which has the label cij . If there are cij > N − 1, then we will put cij in
the cipher text. If there are more than one cij such that cij > N − 1, namely
{cij1 , ...cijt}, we will count the biggest number of decimals of these elements.
Assuming that cijv has the biggest number of decimals, 0 ≤ v ≤ t, we will put
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zeros to the left side of the cijp , p 6= v, such that all new obtained cijl have the
same number of decimals. In this way, we obtain the encrypted text Ti.
7. Using the above steps for all blocks, we obtain the cipher text, by joint
the cipher texts T1T2...Tr.
The decrypting
1. We use the key (a1, a2, ..., ak, s) . The last number s is the length of
encoded blocks.
2. We split the cipher text in blocks of length s and we consider their labels(
ciq, ci(q−1), ..., ci(k−1)
)
. We compute the elements dk, dk+1, ...dq, therefore the
corresponding plain text for each block is ni = dqciq+dq−1ci(q−1)+dq−2ci(q−2)+
...+ dkcik + dk−1ci(k−1).
3. If there are numbers {cij1 , ...cijt} which are greater than N − 1, these
numbers appear with the same number of digits or with new labels, therefore it
is easy to find the real message.
Example 3.3. 1) We consider an alphabet with 27 letters: A, B, C,.....Z,
x, where ”x” represent the blank space, labeled with 0, 1, 2, ..., 26. We want
to encrypt the message ”JOHNxHASxAxDOG”. We split this message in the
following blocks: JOHN, xHAS, xAxD, OGxx. We added two characters at the
end of the last block to obtain a block with 4 letters. We consider a difference
equation of degree four, therefore k = 4, and a1 = 18, a2 = 10, a3 = 13, a4 = 3.
Therefore, the encoding key is SKND, or 18101303. If, for example a1 = 182,
the key will be 182010013003.
To the first block, JOHN, will correspond the number n1 = 9140713. We
have d0 = d1 = d2 = 0, d3 = 1. We obtain the following terms
d4 = 18, d5 = 334, d6 = 6205, d7 = 115267, d8 = 2141252. Since d8 ≤ 9140713 ≤
d9, we obtain the key (18, 10, 13, 3, 6).
We have
n1 = 4 · d8 + 575705,
575705 = 4 · d7 + 114637,
114637 = 18 · d6 + 2947,
2947 = 8 · d5 + 275,
275 = 15 · d4 + 5,
5 = 5·d3, therefore, we obtain the labels for the encrypted text (4, 4, 18, 8, 15, 5).
It results that the first block is encrypted in the word EESIPF. To do this faster,
we can use the below MAPLE procedures:
> crypt(JOHN);
9140713
>lineq(4, 18, 10, 13, 3, 9140713);
6
40418081505
> decrypt(40418081505);
EESIPF
For the second block, xHAS, we get the number n2 = 26070018. Using the
same algorithm, we obtain the following labels for the encrypted text (12, 3, 4, 13, 1, 13) .
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The second block is encrypted in the word MDENBN. To ease calculations, we
can use the below MAPLE procedures:
> crypt(xHAS);
26070018
>lineq(4, 18, 10, 13, 3, 26070018);
6
120304130113
> decrypt(120304130113);
MDENBN
To the third block, xAxD, corresponds the number n3 = 26002603. We ob-
tain
the labels for the encrypted text (12, 2, 12, 7, 13, 13) . It results that the third
block is encrypted in the word MCMHNN, by using the below MAPLE proce-
dures:
> crypt(xAxD);
26002603
>lineq(4, 18, 10, 13, 3, 26002603);
6
120212071313
> decrypt(120212071313);
MCMHNN
To the last block, OGxx, corresponds the number n4 = 14062626. We get
the labels for the encrypted text (6, 10, 10, 1, 3, 6) . The fourth block is encrypted
in the word GKKBDG, as we can see by using the below MAPLE procedures:
> crypt(OGxx);
14062626
>lineq(4, 18, 10, 13, 3, 14062626);
6
61010010306
> decrypt(61010010306);
GKKBDG
Therefore, the encrypted text is EESIPFMDENBNMCMHNNGKKBDG.
For decoding, we use the key (18, 10, 13, 3, 6) .We split the message in blocks
of length 6: EXKLFC, MDENBN, MCMHNN, GKKBDG. For this, we can use
the below MAPLE procedure:
> split(EESIPFMDENBNMCMHNNGKKBDG, 6);
[EESIPF MDENBN MCMHNN GKKBDG]
We compute d4 = 18, d5 = 334, d6 = 6208, d7 = 115267, d8 = 2141252. For
EESIPF, we obtain n1 = 2141252·4+115267·4+6205·18+334·8+18·15+5·1 =
9140713, that means we get the word JOHN, as we can see below:
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> delineq(EESIPF,18, 10, 13, 3);
9140713
2) If we consider k = 4, a1 = 18, a2 = 4, a3 = 13, a4 = 3, then, the encoding
key is SEND, or 18041303. In this situation, we have the following terms
d4 = 18, d5 = 328, d6 = 5989, d7 = 109351, d8 = 1996592, and the encrypted
message is E28OQAPNBAPCPNAHPDKHAOIAM.
3) If the alphabet has 27 letters and we received X032121MBD, as an
encrypted block, and we know that this block has ”length” 6, we obtain the
labels (23, 32, 121, 12, 1, 3) , that means 23032121012001003. Indeed, 23 is label
for X, the next two labels are 032 and 121, since we know that the labels have
the same number of digits, in our case 3, since the block has level 6. For this
situation, the procedure decrypt was modified in decryptM by inserting new
characters y for 032 and z for 121.
> decryptM(23032121012001003);
XyzMBD
If the above block has length 7, then the labels are (23, 3, 21, 21, 12, 1, 3).
3.2. An application in Coding Theory
In [1], [4], [9], were presented some applications of Fibonacci numbers and
Fibonacci p−numbers in Coding Theory. With these elements, were defined
some special matrices used for sending messages. In the following, we gener-
alized these results, using the matrices given in relations (2.11) and (2.12) as
a coding matrices for sending messages. These matrices are associated to dif-
ference equation of order k, k a natural number, k ≥ 2, given by the relation
(2.9) , with a1, ...ak positive integers. We attach to this equation the following
equation of degree k
xk − a1x
k−1 − a2x
k−2 − ...− ak = 0 (3.2.)
and we assume that equation (3.2) has k distinct real roots α1, α2, ..., αk, such
that α1 > 1 and α1 > |αi| , i ∈ {2, ..., k}.
We assume that the initial message is represented as a square matrix M =
(mij)i,j∈{1,2,...,k} of order k, with mij ≥ 0, i, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., k}. Considering that
Dnk = (hij)i,j∈{1,2,...,k} is the coding matrix and D
−n
k is the decoding matrix,
we will use the relation
Dnk ·M = E, (3.3.)
as encoding transformation and the relation
M = D−nk ·E, (3.4.)
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as decoding transformation. We define E as code-message matrix.
Theorem 3.4. Withe the above notations, the following statement is true
eij
e(i+r)j
≈ αr1, r ∈ {1, 2, ..., k − 1}, (3.5.)
for i+ r ≤ k.
Proof. Since a1, α2, ..., αk are roots of the equation (3.2) , we have
dn = A1α
n
1 +A2α
n
2 + ...+Akα
n
k , (3.6.)
with coefficients Ai ∈ R, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., k}, obtained from the initial conditions of
difference equation (2.9) . Using relation (3.3) , we get eij =
k∑
t=1
hitmtj . From
relation (2.12) , it results that the elements hij are non-zero elements and are
represented as a linear combination of the terms dn+k−i, dn+k−i−1, ..., dn−i+1,
hij =
k∑
t=1
Btjdn+k−i−t+1,
Btj ∈ {0, 1, a1, a2, ...ak}. For example,
hi1 = dn+k−i =
k∑
t=1
Bt1dn+k−i−t+1,
where B11 = 1, Bt1 = 0, t ∈ {2, ...k},
hi2 =
k−1∑
t=1
at+1dn+k−t−i =
k∑
t=1
Bt2dn+k−i−t+1,
where B12 = 0, B22 = a2, B32 = a3, ...Bk2 = ak, etc.
Therefore, we obtain
eij =
k∑
t=1
(
k∑
q=1
Bqtdn+k−i−q+1
)
mtj
and
e(i+r)j =
k∑
t=1
(
k∑
q=1
Bqtdn+k−i−r−q+1
)
mtj .
Using relation (3.7) , it results
lim
i→∞
eij
e(i+r)j
= lim
i→∞
k∑
t=1
(
k∑
q=1
Bqtdn+k−i−q+1
)
mtj
k∑
t=1
(
k∑
q=1
Bqtdn+k−i−r−q+1
)
mtj
=
11
= lim
i→∞
k∑
t=1
(
k∑
q=1
Bqt
(
k∑
s=1
Asα
n+k−i−q+1
s
))
mtj
k∑
t=1
(
k∑
q=1
Bqt
(
k∑
s=1
Asα
n+k−i−r−q+1
s
))
mtj
=
= lim
i→∞
k∑
q,s=1
Γsqα
n+k−i−q+1
s
k∑
q,s=1
Γsqα
n+k−i−r−q+1
s
=
= lim
i→∞
Γ11α
n+k−i
1 +Γ12α
n+k−i−1
1 +...+Γ1kα
n−i+1
1 +Γ21α
n+k−i
2 +Γ22α
n+k−i−1
2 +...
Γ11α
n+k-i-r
1 +Γ12α
n+k-i-r-1
1 +...+Γ1kα
n-i-r+1
1 +Γ21α
n+k-i-r
2 +Γ22α
n+k-i-r-1
2 +...
=L.
where Γsq = As
(
k∑
t=1
Bqtmtj
)
. We remark that Γsq 6= 0, due to the choice of
the elements As, Bqt and mtj . Since α1 > 1 and α1 > |αi| , i ∈ {2, ..., k}, we
obtain that L = αr1. From here, if we consider i + r ≤ k, it results
eij
e(i+r)j
≈
αr1, r ∈ {1, 2, ..., k − 1}.
Remark 3.5. From relation (3.3) , we have detM · detDnk = detE, then
(−1)
(k+1)n
ank detM = detE, (3.7.)
by using (2.13) .
The matrices Dnk are used for sending messages. In this way, this method
ensures infinite variants for the chioce of transformation of the initial matrix
M .
The method developed above has the property to detect and correct errors in
the submitted message E. For this purpose, we used Theorem 3.4 and relation
(3.7). From condition (3.7) , we have the relation between detM and detE.
The determinant of the matrix M, detM, is used as a checking element for the
code-message matrix E, when we received it using a communication channel.
After the matrix E and detM were received, we compute detE and we check
if the relation (3.7) is satisfied. If the answer is positive, it results that the
matrix E and detM were transmitted without errors. If the answer is negative,
we have that the matrix E or detM were received with errors. For correct
the errors, we will use relation (3.5). First, we suppose that we have single
error in the received matrix E. Since such an error can appears on the position
(i, j) , i, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., k}, it results that we can have k2 possibilities. If we check
for all k2 possibilities and we don’t obtain natural numbers as solution for the
received error, it is possible to have double errors, triple errors,..., k2− 1 errors.
If in all these situations we do not obtain positive integer solutions, it results
that detM was sent with errors or the matrix E has k2−fold errors and this
matrix is not correctable. Therefore, the matrix E must be rejected.
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This method, in which we use the matrices Dnk as encoding matrices and
D−nk as decoding matrices, generalizes the methods developed in [9] for Fi-
bonacci numbers, in [1] and [2] for Fibonacci p−numbers and in [11] for Fi-
bonacci k−numbers to a difference equation of order k, k ∈ N, k ≥ 2, given by
the relation (2.9) , with a1, ...ak positive integers.
The error correcting codes are used widely in modern communications net-
works. There are many parameters associated to error correcting codes which
determines the ability of a code to detect and correct errors (Hamming distance,
the rate of a code, etc.) One of these parameters is the potential error correction
coefficient S, which is the ratio between all correctable errors and all detectable
errors.
We can remark that the code message matrix E can contain single, dou-
ble,....,
k2−fold errors. Therefore, we have
∁1k2 + ∁
2
k2 + ...+ ∁
k2
k2 = 2
k2 − 1
possible errors. Since k2−fold errors from the code-message matrix E are not
correctable, we can correct 2k
2
− 2 errors. Therefore we get
S =
2k
2
− 2
2k2 − 1
≈ 1,
that means the correctable possibility of the method is about 100%.
This remark generalized the results obtained in [1] and [2] for particular case
of Fibonacci p−numbers to a difference equation of degree k , defined by (2.9).
Conclusions. In this paper, we presented some applications of a difference
equation of degree k in Cryptography and Coding Theory.
The algorithm for encryption/decryption messages has some advantages:
i) a block of length s is transformed into a block of different length r;
ii) each natural number n has a unique representation using the terms of
this sequence, that means a number cannot have the same encrypted value as
another number;
iii) this method give us a high versatility, ensuring infinite variants for the
chioce of the encrypted keys.
Moreover, using the matrix associated to a difference equation of degree k
we have a lot of possibilities to chose a matrix for sending messages, defining
error correcting codes with a very good potential error correction coefficient.
The above results encourages us to study these equations for finding other
interesting applications of them.
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Appendix
In the following, we present some MAPLE procedures used in the encryption
and decryption processes.
crypt:=proc(st)
local ll,nn,ss,ii,num,n;
num := table([’A’=0, ’B’=1, ’C’=2, ’D’=3, ’E’=4, ’F’=5,
’G’=6, ’H’=7,’I’=8, ’J’=9, K’=10, ’L’=11, ’M’=12, ’N’=13,
’O’=14,’P’=15, ’Q’=16, ’R’=17, ’S’=18, ’T’=19, ’U’=20,
’V’=21, ’W’=22, ’X’=23, ’Y’=24, ’Z’=25, ’x’=26]):
ll := length(st): nn := 1: for ii from 1 to ll do
ss := num[substring(st, ii .. ii)]:
nn := 100* nn+ss: od:
n:=nn-10^(2* ll):print(n):end:
save crypt, ‘crypt.m‘;
crypt(JOHN)
9140713
lineq := proc (k, a1, a2, a3, a4, n)
local AA, i, jj, cc, nn, NN, s,j;
j:=100; AA := array(0 .. j); AA[0] := 0; AA[1] := 0; AA[2] := 0; AA[3] := 1;
for i from 0 to j-4 do AA[i+4] := AA[i+3]*a1+AA[i+2]*a2+AA[i+1]*a3+AA[i]*a4;
if n < AA[i+4] and AA[i+3] < n then jj := i+3 end if;
s := jj-k+2 end do; cc := array(1 .. s); cc[1] := trunc(n/AA[jj]);
nn := n-cc[1]*AA[jj]; for i from 2 to s do cc[i] := trunc(nn/AA[jj-i+1]);
nn := nn-cc[i]*AA[jj-i+1] end do; NN := 10^(2*s-2)*cc[1];
for i from 2 to s do NN := NN+10^(2*s-2*i)*cc[i] end do;print(s); print(NN);
end proc; save lineq, ‘lineq.m‘; lineq(4, 18, 10, 13, 3, 9140713):
6
40418081505
decrypt:=proc(nn)
local alpha, ss,mm,rr,ii, ans,A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H,II,J,K,L,M,
O,P,Q,R,S,T,U,V,W,X,Y,Z,x;
alpha:= table([0 = A, 1 = B, 2 = C, 3 = D, 4 = E,
5 = F, 6 = G, 7 = H, 8 = I, 9 = J, 10 = K, 11 = L,
12 = M, 13 = N, 14 = O,15=P,16=Q,17=R,18=S,19=T,
20=U,21=V,22=W,23=X,24=Y,25=Z,26=x]):
mm := nn: rr:=floor(trunc(evalf(log10(mm)))/2)+1: ans:=‘ ‘:
for ii from 1 to rr do mm:=mm/100: ss:=alpha[frac(mm)*100]:
ans:=cat(ss,ans): mm:=trunc(mm) od: ans;
end: save decrypt, ‘decrypt.m‘;
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decrypt(40418081505);
EESIPF
decryptM:=proc(nn)
local alpha, ss,mm,rr,ii, ans,A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H,II,J,K,L,M,
O,P,Q,R,S,T,U,V,W,X,Y,Z,x;
alpha:= table([0 = A, 1 = B, 2 = C, 3 = D, 4 = E,
5 = F, 6 = G, 7 = H, 8 = I, 9 = J, 10 = K, 11 = L,
12 = M, 13 = N, 14 = O,15=P,16=Q,17=R,18=S,19=T,
20=U,21=V,22=W,23=X,24=Y,25=Z,26=x,32=y,121=z]):
mm := nn: rr:=floor(trunc(evalf(log10(mm)))/3)+1: ans:=‘ ‘:
for ii from 1 to rr do mm:=mm/1000: ss:=alpha[frac(mm)*1000]:
ans:=cat(ss,ans): mm:=trunc(mm) od: ans;
end: save decryptM, ‘decryptM.m‘;
decryptM(23032121012001003);
XyzMBD
delineq := proc (st, a1, a2, a3, a4)
local AA, BB, cc, ll,nn, num, s,ii;
num := table([’A’=0, ’B’=1, ’C’=2, ’D’=3, ’E’=4, ’F’=5,
’G’=6, ’H’=7,’I’=8, ’J’=9, K’=10, ’L’=11, ’M’=12, ’N’=13,
’O’=14,’P’=15, ’Q’=16, ’R’=17, ’S’=18, ’T’=19, ’U’=20,
’V’=21, ’W’=22, ’X’=23, ’Y’=24, ’Z’=25, ’x’=26]):
ll := length(st): BB:=array(1..ll):AA:=array(0..ll+2):
for ii from 1 to ll do BB[ii]:= num[substring(st, ii .. ii)] od:
AA[0] := 0: AA[1] := 0: AA[2] := 0: AA[3] := 1:
for ii from 0 to ll-2 do
AA[ii+4] := AA[ii+3]*a1+AA[ii+2]*a2+AA[ii+1]*a3+AA[ii]*a4;od:
nn[]:=0: for ii from 1 to ll do nn:=nn+BB[ii]*AA[ll+3- ii]: od:
print(nn);end proc; save delineq, ‘delineq.m‘;
delineq(EESIPF,18, 10, 13, 3):
9140713
split := proc (st, k)
local ll, ii, rr, AA;
ll := length(st); rr := 0; AA := array(1 .. ll/k);
for ii to ll/k do AA[ii] := substring(st, ii+rr .. ii+k-1+rr);
rr := rr+k-1 end do; print(AA);
end proc; save split, ‘split.m‘;
split(EESIPFMDENBNMCMHNNGKKBDG, 6);
[EESIPF MDENBN MCMHNN GKKBDG]
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